Country Index: USA: Weapons

Country Index: USA: Weapons


Country Index: USA: Weapons - History

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Documents 2A-C: Annual Public Reports of the Defense Department

Document 2A: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1964 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1966), excerpts from "Report of the Secretary of Defense"

Document 2B: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1966 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1967), excerpts from "Report of the Secretary of Defense"

Document 2C: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1967 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1969), excerpts from "Report of the Secretary of Defense"

The routine, non-classified nature of the numbers of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons systems during the 1960s is evident in these Pentagon reports. Secretaries of Defense believed that they had to present such details to the interested U.S. public and to the Soviet Union in order to demonstrate that the United States had a "deterrent power that no aggressor could ignore." For example, the report for FY 1967 shows the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs that would characterize two-thirds of the nuclear "triad" for years to come: 1000 Minutemen, 54 Titan IIs, and 656 SLBMs.

Document 3: Raymond L. Garthoff, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs to Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Foy Kohler, "Subjective and Objective Strategic Balances," 31 March 1967, Top Secret, excised copy
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files. Spurgeon Keeny Files, box 1, ABM Deployment Decision & McNamara Speech of 9/18/67

During the Cold War, analysts of military affairs played "numbers games" comparing U.S. and Soviet strategic force levels to make a case for arms control, for increases in military spending, or for other policies. In a top secret memo based on the latest intelligence, Raymond L. Garthoff, a State Department expert on Soviet affairs and strategic nuclear policy, showed how hard data could be spun to give different interpretations of the U.S.-Soviet military balance. As Garthoff observed in his memoir, "the strategic relationship could be depicted as very reassuring or very dangerous, depending on how one selected the forces to be compared." That Garthoff prepared such a report was worrisome to senior military leaders because it showed how the data could be accurately presented to "undermine the rather alarmist comparisons that were used to support Defense budget programs." (Note 2)

While Garthoff used then-sensitive numbers based on intelligence estimates of Soviet forces and non-sensitive numbers of U.S. delivery systems as of March 1967, security reviewers have released more of the former than the latter. When the Lyndon B. Johnson Library finally released this document in 2004, after a seven-year waiting period (possibly due to delays at the Energy Department), the redacted numbers were a surprise, but it was not yet evident that they signaled a trend.

An appeal led to the release of a few numbers (e.g., strategic bombers), but the Defense Department and the Energy Department continue to withhold the numbers of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs, among other weapon systems. This document is currently under appeal at the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).

Using the information in the Secretary of Defense reports cited in section 2A-C, it is possible to fill in some of the blanks with some assurance (although the numbers may be slightly off). For example, the excised numbers in "General Strategic Balance", section 1, are 934 and 592 respectively. The numbers in section 3 are 988 (934 Minutemen plus 54 Titan IIs), 592 and 1580 respectively. The excised number in section 4 is 988. The numbers in section 5 are 1054, 120, and 54 respectively. For "Missile Launching Submarines," the key excised numbers are 592 SLBMs and 37 submarines, with a planned fleet of 41.

Documents 4A and B: Reclassification of Public Information from the 1970s:

Document 4A: BDM Corporation, History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense, 1956-[1972], Vol. II, Book 1, Draft, 21 May 1975, Top Secret Excised Copy

Document 4B: Toward A National Security Strategy of Realistic Defense: Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Fiscal Year 1972 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, Before the House Armed Services Committee, March 9, 1971 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1971), excerpt

Recently, the Army Department declassified much of a huge history of air and missile defense prepared by the BDM Corporation during the mid-1970s. Included in the study are several charts depicting U.S. strategic policy under Eisenhower, Johnson-Kennedy, and Nixon that Pentagon reviewers excised. The charts as published by BDM were marked "unclassified" because the compilers of the history had taken them from Secretary of Defense Laird's public report to Congress from March 1971. That report has been publicly available since it was released 35 years ago. Evidently the Pentagon reviewers did not know where BDM had gotten the charts, but one wonders if it would have made a difference in light of their determination to excise all numbers of strategic weapons. The charts are currently under appeal at the Department of Defense.

Document 5: Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program, March 9, 1974 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1971), excerpt

Other public reports by Secretaries of Defense during the 1970s showed the declassified status of the numbers of U.S. strategic missiles and bombers. The Schlesinger report is particularly interesting because it included "force loadings": the total numbers for both the Soviet Union and the United States of nuclear bombs and missile warheads, including multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

Documents 6A and B: Henry Kissinger to President Ford, "Talking Points, NSC Meeting, Monday, October 7, 1974," Top Secret

Document 6A: National Security Council FOIA release, 1999

Document 6B: Excised copy released by Gerald R. Ford Library, May 2006 Source: National Security Council Meeting File, box 1, NSC meeting 10/7/74

Dissimilar releases of Henry Kissinger's "Talking Points" prepared for President Ford as background for an NSC meeting on the SALT II negotiations highlight the conflicting policies that security reviewers have taken toward releasing or continuing the classification of the numbers of nuclear delivery systems. Variant A, an earlier release by the National Security Council in 1999, illustrates the Clinton administration's openness. As is evident from variant B, recently released by the Ford Library, the Defense Department's security reviewers are using the same procedures that governed the recent release of the McNamara DPM from 1964 and the BDM history: excise all numbers of U.S. strategic weapons systems. When the National Security Council met that day to discuss SALT II, Kissinger read from the "Talking Points" to keep the participants up-to-speed. The declassified minutes of the NSC meeting, also released in 1999 and available on the Gerald R. Ford Library Web site, reproduces the text of parts of Kissinger's briefing paper, which he read to the meeting participants, including virtually all of the numbers excised from the most recent release.


Part II- Overseas Deployments

From the 1950s through the early 1990s, the U.S. government deployed nuclear weapons around the world, from the North Atlantic and Western Europe to South Korea, the Philippines, and the Western Pacific. Reflecting the East-West tensions of that period, the Pentagon deployed nearly 13,000 nuclear weapons outside the continental United States, with many of them (over 7,000) in NATO Europe. The deployments of nuclear weapons reflected U.S. and NATO war plans at the time as well as the conviction of U.S. government officials that the deployments would demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the security of alliance partners around the world it was a sign to an adversary that military action against a U.S. ally carried the risk of escalating into nuclear warfare. As tensions with the Soviet Union finally ended during the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the U.S. government withdrew thousands of nuclear weapons from overseas bases, leaving only residual deployments of several hundred weapons in NATO Europe (Germany, Belgium, Italy, and the United Kingdom). (Note 3)

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. government treated the overseas deployments of nuclear weapons, and the arrangements surrounding them, as highly secret even the U.S. Congress had difficulty getting information on them [See documents 10a-c]. What a U.S. Senate subcommittee observed in 1970 remains pertinent today: a "veil of secrecy hides the presence of such weapons. Nowhere is this veil stronger than in the United States." (Note 4) That secrecy loosened up a bit after the Cold War, with some documents on the historic deployments released at NARA, but it has returned. Despite the wholesale changes in overseas deployments at the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense and Department of Energy have been taking an extremely tough position on information concerning the Cold War deployments, treating all of the information as secret. Even a 1999 decision by the Defense Department to release a History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons July 1945 Through September 1977, in massively excised form, has been partly reversed. In that release, the Pentagon acknowledged that the United Kingdom and West Germany had been nuclear deployment sites during the Cold War. Under the current stricter standards it has not released any information on those deployments. (Note 5)

A recent "release" of a "Draft Compendium of Nuclear Weapons Arrangements," prepared in October 1968 by the Department of State's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, demonstrates the Pentagon's rigid position. After Defense Department reviewers released the compendium in response to a mandatory review request by the National Security Archive, they disclosed few meaningful sentences or phrases (see Document 1). An appeal produced no significant new information. An appeal pending before the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) may lead to the release of more details.

The adverse decision on the "Compendium" shows the inflexibility of policy on the historic deployments and related information. Yet such intransigence stands in the face of declassification actions during the 1990s, as well as the release of information by at least one foreign government, which disclosed significant details on the history of the overseas deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons during the Cold War. While the Canadian government and, to some extent, the U.S. State Department, have been forthcoming in declassifying information on the Ottawa-Washington nuclear relationship (see Documents 8a-c), the Defense Department continues to withhold information on the particulars of that relationship. (Note 6)

The numerous excisions in the compendium also reflect the approach that the Department of Energy has followed in implementing the Kyl-Lott Amendment. Sparked by allegations of Chinese nuclear espionage during the late 1990s and DOE concerns about inadvertent releases of nuclear weapons information at the National Archives, Congress mandated the Department to comb through millions of pages of material, some of which had been open to the public for years, and sequester documents that contained sensitive nuclear weapons information. What the reviewers have been looking for are documents with "restricted data" (RD), which includes information on nuclear weapons design and the production of "special nuclear material. This information is legitimately secret even if the physical principles of a nuclear weapon are well known, building a useable weapon is a complex task and the availability of secret information on the design of nuclear weapons could accelerate nuclear proliferation. Also in the scope of DOE's archival search is "formerly restricted data" (FRD), which concerns the military utilization of nuclear weapons, including information on tests, command/control methods, and stockpiles, including overseas deployments, current and historical. (Note 7)

Since the DOE began its review it has released twenty-one quarterly reports on "the inadvertent release" of classified atomic energy information. They show that among the documents that have been returned to the vaults at NARA those with FRD significantly outnumber those with RD. (Note 8) Of over 204 million pages of records reviewed by DOE officials so far, some 4,326 pages were in the FRD category while only 2,314 pages were in the RD category [See Appendix A]. The detailed results of the review remain classified but it is possible that DOE reviewers flagged significant numbers of the pages with FRD because they include information on the historic locations of overseas nuclear deployments. (Note 9)

The cost of the Kyl-Lott documents review has recently become available, thanks to the Department of Energy's Office of Classification. (Note 10) So far, according to DOE, the review of the 204 million pages has cost nearly $22 million. While the average cost of the review was about 9 cents per page, the average cost of locating the suspect information was high. The cost of finding one of the 2,766 documents was almost $8,000, while the cost of finding one of the withdrawn RD and FRD pages was around $3,300.

The effort to retrieve "RD" nuclear weapons design information is understandable (although whether adversaries would actually have seized opportunities to find the needle in the archival haystack is a problem worth considering). It would have been far better, however, if DOE had undertaken its review with better guidelines enabling it to focus on protecting truly sensitive information instead of impounding documents that may have little or no sensitivity. As the Federation of American Scientists' Steven Aftergood observed during the early phase of the Kyl-Lott review, "The problem is that Congress has said we don't want classified information disclosed without looking at how much nonsense is classified. They have set up a process that is inordinately expensive and time-consuming." (Note 11) That appraisal is as relevant now as it was in 2001.

The problem of overseas nuclear weapons deployment is not simply a matter of FRD. U.S. government agencies have claimed that declassifying the information will compromise war plans still in effect, but that claim seems weak because deployments by themselves cannot demonstrate how the military plans to use any given weapons system. Another claim is that disclosure will harm ongoing diplomatic relations with countries that have hosted U.S. nuclear weapons. As noted earlier, the Canadian government has declassified documents on its nuclear relationship with the Washington, although the Department of Defense continues to deny information on the deployments. Other governments, such as Japan, reluctant to disclose their acquiescence in U.S. nuclear weapons activities during the Cold War (see Document 15), have resisted the declassification of anything that sheds light on the former U.S. nuclear presence on Japanese soil and territorial waters (including Okinawa). NATO governments, such as Turkey, have taken similar stances.

Plainly declassifying information on the Cold War deployments is a complex problem, but the U.S. public deserves something more reasonable than the current blanket policy of secrecy. (Note 12) Years ago a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee argued that "there is no merit to the argument that certain activities must be kept secret because a foreign government demanded they … be kept secret. Such a policy involves the Government of the United States in a web of intrigue which is alien to American traditions." (Note 13)

Despite the massive excisions in the 1968 "Compendium", documents 2 through 11 in this briefing book show that significant information on the overseas nuclear deployments has been available in State Department files at the National Archives. Some were published earlier in 1998 and 2001 National Security Archive compilations on U.S. nuclear history and U.S.-Japan relations which have since become available on the Digital National Security Archive. Others documents were located recently at NARA or released through FOIA requests. One item was declassified by the Canadian government.

Document 7: Memorandum from Philip E. Barringer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to Colonel Haskin et al., 8 October 1968, enclosing memorandum to Barringer from W. J. Lehman, Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 8 October 1968, with draft "Compendium of Nuclear Weapons Arrangements", Top Secret, Excised copy
Source: Mandatory review request to Defense Department, appeal under review at Interagency Secrecy Classification Appeals Panel

During the late 1960s, senior officials at the Office of International Security Affairs at the Pentagon who were involved in negotiations on overseas deployments wanted a wider perspective on previously negotiated arrangements for nuclear weapons storage and transit that the U.S. government had developed with other governments. Morton Halperin, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, remembers that the information was so scattered about the national security bureaucracy that senior officials could not get a full picture of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign relations. Thus, Halperin tasked officials at the State Department and the Department of Defense to produce a compendium that brought the scattered details together. While some military officials objected to putting all of the information in one document because of the danger of a leak, Halperin insisted on it. As Philip Barringer's cover memorandum suggested, the compendium was not necessarily in final form. First, Barringer asked officials at the Joint Staff and other organizations for their comments. Second, "to maintain its usefulness, the compendium would be periodically updated." (Note 14)

The report stayed secret for decades and, despite the recent release, its contents remain classified. When the Defense Department produced it in response to a mandatory review request from the National Security Archive, it excised the text under Executive Order 12958 exemptions (b)(5), which concerns war plans still in effect, (b)(6), which concerns sensitive diplomatic relationships, and (b) (3), which refers to statutory requirements, in this case, Atomic Energy Act strictures against release of RD and FRD.

The compendium includes 23 sections on "nuclear weapons arrangements," but the countries with which Washington made the arrangements are not identified. Despite the heavy excisions, it is possible to fill in the blanks and determine which country is the subject for many of the sections. It is probable that the compendium is in largely alphabetical order, and to the extent that it is, the order and length of some of the sections help identify several key countries including Canada, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Various clues also help pinpoint some of the countries. Nevertheless, as the reader will see, identifying some of the nations with which Washington had nuclear arrangements is very difficult. Using the numbering provided by the Adobe Acrobat scanning system, the editor has tried to identify the countries that are the subject of the individual sections on "Arrangements." Some of the sections are most difficult to identify and the editor welcomes any suggestions on their identification.

p. 3: Afghanistan? -- This may be a reference to Afghanistan if the following assertion is correct: the U.S. Air Force had plans to use Kabul international airport as a "haven" for U.S. strategic bombers during a nuclear war. (Note 15)

pp. 4-5: Australia? Antigua? Bahamas? -- This section refers to a territory where nuclear transit, but not storage, issues were relevant, but more specific identification is highly difficult.

pp. 6-8: Belgium 6-8 -- If this document is organized by the alphabetical order principle, the arrangements discussed on page 6-8 probably concern Belgium, where the United States has deployed nuclear bombs since 1963. That the country at issue in these pages was the site of "strike aircraft" fits that type of deployment. The reference to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) on page 7 confirms that the country at issue in this section is a Western European NATO member.

pp. 9-12: Bermuda? -- Ship movements are likely and the statement about need to establish storage arrangements for anti-submarine warfare weapons is suggestive of Bermuda, which was the subject of Anglo-American negotiations over the basing of nuclear depth charges during the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

pp. 13-20: Canada -- These pages have several clues that point to Canada. The section is relatively lengthy, which reflects the complex nuclear history of the United States and Canada, which goes back to the early Cold War and includes a variety of issues including overflights, storage of weapons, and deployment of delivery vehicles [See documents 8a, b, and c for examples]. (Note 16) Another clue, on page 14, is the reference to the diplomatic clearance of the "annual program of [nuclear weapons] overflights [which] is each June." Declassified documents on the U.S.-Canadian negotiations on the SAC airborne alert program suggest that during the 1960s Washington approached Ottawa in June each year to begin negotiations over the overflight program for the next fiscal year. Also telling is the discussion of consultation arrangements beginning on page 17 arrangements for U.S.-Canadian heads of state consultation on nuclear use decisions began in the early months of the Korean War and developed further in the mid-1960s. (Note 17)

pp. 21-22: Denmark -- These pages probably refer to Denmark because of the mention of ship visits which was an issue between the United States and the Danish government during the 1960s. The Danes wanted a commitment from the United States that U.S. Navy ships visiting Danish ports were not nuclear armed. In a 2 May 1967 telegram to the embassy in Copenhagen, however, the State Department and the Pentagon jointly refused to make such a commitment because it ran against their "neither confirm nor deny" stance on the presence of nuclear weapons on ships. Under the circumstances, Washington informed the embassy that it would rather stop the visits than change the policy [See documents 10A-B]. It is very likely that the State telegram cited on page 22 of the compendium is the same document, because it includes language that the "U.S. would rather cancel the ship visits than alter the policy."

pp. 23-26: Greece -- If pages 21-22 are on Denmark and pages 29-33 are on Italy, then it is likely that pages 23-26 discuss arrangements with Greece, where the United States deployed nuclear weapons beginning in 1960. The editor considered the possibility that the reference is the "Government of the Republic of China," often used to describe Taiwan, but the U.S. Army stored no nuclear weapons on Taiwan makes that country a less likely candidate (for Taiwan in this report, see pp. 64-66). In late 1960 members and staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy visited Greece and other countries hosting U.S. nuclear storage sites and commented on the lax custody arrangements, the risks of an accident when moving nuclear weapons, and the difficult circumstances under which U.S. military personnel guarded nuclear weapons stored only a few miles from Soviet bloc territory: recently "two of these young men went out of their heads, apparently because of the trying conditions." [see document 11].

pp. 27-28: Iceland? -- These pages may refer to Iceland, which was not a storage site, but it is likely that U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons transited through Reykjavik. Also, according to a 1961 memorandum to the White House (see document 12) the Icelandic government required its consent before the United States could use its bases for nuclear missions. The "however" on page 27 may refer to this understanding.

pp. 29-33: Italy -- The United States has deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems in Italy since 1956 (see document 13). The clue that confirms that this section is on Italy is the reference on page 30 to the 13 January 1962 "consent agreement" the U.S. and Italian government signed such an agreement that very day and its contents have been declassified [see document 14]. The most famous nuclear weapons deployment in Italy was that of the short-lived Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) during the early 1960s, which were part of the secret trade that helped end the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Note 18)

pp. 34-38: Japan -- The United States never stored complete nuclear weapons on Japan's main islands (Kyushu, Honshu, or Hokkaido), but the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 included language concerning the transit of nuclear weapons. Under the Treaty, the United States would have to consult with the Japanese government if Washington found it necessary to deploy ("introduce") nuclear weapons onto, or build "bases for nuclear weapons" on, Japanese soil. The treaty, however, did require consultations concerning "transit of ports or airbases in Japan by United States vessels and aircraft, regardless of their armament" [See document 15]. In other words, Washington would not tell Tokyo if aircraft carriers visiting Japanese ports or U.S. bombers carrying nuclear weapons stopped at U.S. bases for short periods of time. The discussion on pages 34-38 plainly relates to such issues and most certainly concerns Japan.

pp. 39-41: Netherlands -- Given the alphabetical principle as well as the numerous reports on nuclear deployments in that country, (Note 19) these pages are possibly on the Netherlands, where the United States has deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems since the 1950s. The various references to "intra-theater" are suggestive of a NATO deployment.

pp. 42-44: Norway -- Norway is possibly the subject of these pages, because they include citation of public statements by a government that in the "past that the Agreement does not permit storage of nuclear weapons." During the late 1950s the Norwegian government publicly declared its opposition to peacetime nuclear weapons deployments, although it would accept their introduction in the event of war. The "Agreement" may have been a 17 October 1952 aide mémoire that gave the U.S. Air Force access to two bases, at Sola and Gardermoen, in the event of war. (Note 20)

p. 45:?

pp. 46-49: ? This section refers to a major deployment site where the United States and the host government exchanged diplomatic notes authorizing storage and where the host received briefings beginning in 1967 on numbers and types of weapons. At first the editor thought that these pages were on the Philippines because the pages were in the right section alphabetically and that country was certainly a deployment site (see documents 17A-C). Yet, this section mentions an exchange of notes and as far as the editor knows there was no exchange of notes with the Philippines government on nuclear weapons storage the arrangements were strictly informal. The possibility that the pages concern Okinawa was set aside because that island was under U.S. occupation through 1972 and the exchange of diplomatic notes mentioned on page 46 would have been unnecessary. These pages are a puzzle.

pp. 50-51: Portugal -- It is possible that these pages refer to Portugal because of the likelihood that nuclear-armed U.S. warships stopped in Lisbon. There appears, however, to be no discussion of access to Portuguese bases, such as the Azores, which appears to have been an issue (see document 12).

p. 52: Puerto Rico -- The 1977 Department of Defense study shows that Puerto Rico was a deployment/storage site between 1956 and 1975, making it possible that this section concerns the Commonwealth.

pp. 53-54: ?

pp. 55-59: Republic of Korea - This section on a major deployment site may refer to ROK, which alphabetically would fit right before Spain. As the 1977 report showed, the U.S. had significant nuclear deployments in South Korea. The difficulty with this identification is that page 58 refers to "U.S. Navy and Air Force Nuclear Weapons Storage" but the 1977 report did not identify any naval nuclear weapons among those that were deployed. Either that report was in error or this section concerns another country.

pp. 60-63: Spain -- These pages are very likely about Spain, because of the reference to the off-loading of Polaris and Poseidon missiles on page 60. Polaris and later Poseidon submarines routinely visited Rota naval base starting in the mid-1960s. Moreover, the 1977 Department of Defense study on nuclear custody shows the deployment of naval nuclear weapons to Spain, such as ASROC and Talos. U.S. "Navy Nuclear Weapons Storage" is mentioned on page 63 of the compendium. Besides naval nuclear weapons, Spain provided bases for SAC bombers and the airborne alert program of the 1960s included routine flights near the U.S. base at Palomares, Spain where KC-135 tankers refueled nuclear-armed B-52s in mid-air (until a famous crash in 1966).

pp. 64-66: Taiwan -- These pages probably concern Taiwan, where a deployment of nuclear weapons was closely held and known, on the Taiwanese side, only to President Chiang Kai-Shek and probably his son, Chiang Ching-kuo. Ships visits there would have been probable and until 1974 the U.S. Air Force stored nuclear bombs there for use by U.S. fighter-bombers. In addition, during the late 1950s-early 1960s, nuclear-armed Matador missiles were deployed on the island.

pp. 67-70: Turkey -- Another important country where the United States has deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems is Turkey, which may be the subject of these pages. Jupiter IRBMs were the most famous nuclear delivery system deployed in Turkey, because of the secret Turkey-Cuba trade that helped resolve the Cuban missile crisis, but the more routine deployments included 8 in. howitzers and Honest John missiles, hence the reference to "U.S. Army Nuclear Weapons Storage" on page 69. The reference to "Tactical Strike Aircraft" also corresponds to Turkey where U.S. fighter/bombers have been deployed since the late 1950s. In the early years of the deployment, U.S. officials were worried about the stability of the Turkish government, especially around the time of the 1960 coup when the "situation was so unstable that twice [SACEUR] General Norstad almost ordered all the weapons to be evacuated." [See document 11].

pp. 71-78: United Kingdom -- The subject of pages 71-78 can only be the United Kingdom. Like Canada, it would have taken a number of pages to discuss the complex U.S.-U.K. nuclear relationship, which dated back to the 1940s and early 1950s, when SAC sought "islands" for the possibility of rapid nuclear strikes on Soviet targets (see document 2a for information on the early deployments). As with Canada, the text, beginning on page 73, includes a discussion of "consultation arrangements," which had a long history thus, the text refers to letters from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, which are very likely the letters concerning nuclear use consultation arrangements that London and Washington affirmed during the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, the text on page 72 includes what may be a reference to the negotiations with the British on storage of nuclear ASW in Bermuda. (Note 21)

This document leaves the status of two important nuclear weapons host countries up in the air--the Philippines and the Federal Republic of Germany--which were both deployment sites in 1968. None of the pages in the compendium seem to fit West Germany, a major deployment site beginning in 1954 (see document 16) or the Philippines, a deployment site until 1977 [see documents 17A-C]. (Note 22) It is difficult to guess which pages cover those two countries it is possible that the compendium did not cover them, unless some of the sections are out of alphabetical order, which cannot be ruled out.

Documents 8A-C: Canada and the United Kingdom

Document 8A: Untitled Department of State memorandum on nuclear relations with Canada, France, and United Kingdom, 17 June 1952. Top Secret
Source: National Archives, Record Group 50, Department of State Records (hereinafter RG 59), Lot 65D478. Records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1950-1962, box 2, 11.2.A NN France Pt. II, 1952-1953 Defense (also available in Digital National Security Archive and published National Security Archive microfiche collection, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68, Washington, D.C., 1998)

Document 8B: Summary Record, United States-Canada Political-Military Meeting, 19 November 1958
Source: RG 59, Department of State Decimal Files 1955-1959, 611.42/11-1958, released in full through FOIA appeal

Document 8C: General J. V. Allard, Chief of Defence Staff, to the [Defence] Minister, "Nuclear ASW Weapons Storage in Canada," 10 March 1967. Top Secret
Source: Canadian Department of Defense Access to Information Release, from Directorate of History & Heritage (DHH), Raymont Collection, 73/1223 Series 1, file 314, "Nuclear Weapons for Canadian Forces" (courtesy of John Clearwater)

By the early 1950s, the United States had negotiated with the British and the Canadians and contemplated talks with the French to reach agreements on nuclear weapons deployments that would "improve our posture in the event of hostilities." To deploy nuclear weapons on French territory, the State Department envisioned negotiations at "the highest diplomatic level," even though the Truman administration had taken matters in its own hands by stockpiling weapons at SAC bases in French Morocco without having received permission. With Ottawa and London, the situation was more straightforward both countries had already agreed to the deployment of non-nuclear components as well as the construction of storage facilities. Indeed, only weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War the U.S. air base at Goose Bay became the site of a highly secret temporary deployment of 11 nuclear weapons-possibly only the non-nuclear components: wiring, high explosives, and casing minus the nuclear fuel. (Note 23)

During the years after 1950, as John Clearwater has shown in several major studies, the United States deployed a variety of air defense and naval nuclear weapons and delivery systems on Canadian territory, although the deployments required complex negotiations over time. A detailed record of a high level Canada-U.S. defense meeting later in the decade illuminates the complex nuclear relationship that was developing between Ottawa and Washington, with such issues on the table as storage arrangements for various weapons, SAC overflights, and procedures in the event of nuclear weapons accidents during SAC flights over Canada. In addition, the participants reviewed procedures for raising the state of readiness for the newly created North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). A document from a decade later details Canada-U.S. discussions over arrangements to deploy U.S. airborne nuclear anti-submarine warfare weapons, which required agreement on rules of engagement and authorization for use, among other considerations.

Document 9: L. Wainstein et al., The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945-1972, Institute for Defense Analyses Study S-467, June 1975, Top Secret, excerpt
Source: FOIA request to Department of Defense (also available in National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68)

This declassified history, produced as a resource for the Defense Department's official study, The History of the Strategic Arms Competition (1981), was one of the first declassification releases of information on overseas U.S. nuclear deployments during the early Cold War. (Note 24) It includes details on the initial deployments of weapons components to the United Kingdom, Morocco, and aircraft carriers and the later deployment, in 1954, of complete nuclear weapons to Morocco, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, as well as non-nuclear deployments to Japan. Surprisingly, the authors did not mention Canada this may well have been an oversight because they had complete access to classified studies on custody/deployment issues.

Documents 10A-B: Denmark: Visits by Nuclear Armed Ships

Document 10A: U.S. Embassy Denmark cable 1245 to State Department, "U.S. Naval Visit Approved Provided Ships Have No Nuclear Weapons Abroad," 24 April 1967, Secret

Document 10B: State Department cable 18627 to U.S. Embassy Denmark, "Nuclear Weapons on Visiting Ships," 3 May 1967, Secret, excised copy
Source: RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967-1969, DEF Den-US

In the context of an escalating Vietnam War, visits by U.S. warships were none too popular and the Danish press and public wondered aloud whether the ships were nuclear-armed. With U.S. ship visits scheduled for the coming months, U.S. ambassador Katharine E. White suggested that the traditional "neither confirm nor deny" stance was inadequate and that Washington take Danish authorities "into our confidence" by advising them that the ships did not carry nuclear weapons. The reply message, prepared jointly by the Navy and the State Department, and cited in the discussion of Denmark in document one, informed the Ambassador that her suggestion had been rejected because neither the Defense Department nor the State Department wanted to break from "long practice and tradition" of non-comment on the armaments of visiting warships: "for overriding security reasons, partly involving precedent this would set, US cannot be put in position of stating publicly and unequivocally that weapons are not aboard warship, even when that may be accurate statement." If Danish authorities did not withdraw their request, it was better that the ship visits did not occur if the alternative was a "major press campaign" on nuclear weapons that could harden the government's position.

Document 11: Memorandum of conversation, "Meeting with Three Members and Staff of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Nuclear Test Negotiations, MRBM Project and Report of JCAE Trip to Europe," 29 November 1960, Secret
Source: RG 59, State Department Decimal Files 1960-1963, 397.5611-GE/12-2960
(Also available in National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68)

Concern over security arrangements for U.S. nuclear weapons then being deployed to NATO Europe led the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) to conduct a major investigation of custody arrangements during 1960-1961. Shortly after committee members and staff returned from an inspection trip they met with State Department staffers who specialized in nuclear weapons policy issues, including Philip Farley, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy. After a discussion of NATO issues with highly skeptical committee members, who wondered whether NATO was a "going concern or are we handing on to a corpse," the JCAE staff presented a report on the trip. Its purpose had been to "see as many different custody situations as possible in as many different locales as possible," so the group traveled east from the United Kingdom as far as Greece and Turkey, where they were unsettled by the lax control arrangements over U.S. nuclear weapons deployed at NATO bases.

Document 12: Lucius D. Battle, Executive Secretary, Department of State, to McGeorge Bundy, the White House, "Check List of Presidential Actions," 28 July 1961, Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Department of State Decimal Files, 1960-1963, 700.56311/7-2861 (available in National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68)

This document sheds light on the more important nuclear weapons arrangements that Washington had with other governments, especially concerning the uses of bases for nuclear strikes during a military crisis.

Document 13: Letter from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, 12 April 1956, Top Secret
Source: Department of State Records, Records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1950-1962, box 2, II.2.A.- NN-France 1953-1956, also available in National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68)

Through this letter, Dulles informed the Pentagon that he agreed with plans to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons in Italy as he noted, Ambassador Clare Booth Luce had already received the approval of the Italian Defense Ministry.

Document 14: U.S. Embassy Rome Despatch 525 to Department of State, "Transmitting Documents Constituting Military Atomic Stockpile and 'Consent' Agreements," 17 January 1962, Secret
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 1960-1963, 611.657/1-1762

With the pending deployment of Jupiter missiles, which were very difficult to conceal, the Italian government sought a formal agreement with Washington on nuclear deployment arrangements. An agreement took time to negotiate, especially when Rome insisted that the U.S. not use nuclear weapons based in Italy until they had secured the Italian government's consent. While the Pentagon and the State Department wanted the United States to have freedom of action in using nuclear weapons, they had already agreed to a "two man rule" for Jupiter missile deployments in Italy, ensuring that missile launches would require both a U.S. and an Italian officer to turn a key before missile launch. Thus, it was difficult to reject the consent proposal suggested by the Italian Foreign Ministry the final stockpile agreement met Rome's political requirements. This agreement is very likely the one mentioned in the 1968 nuclear weapons arrangements compendium [see document 7, section on Italy]. (Note 25)

Document 15: U.S. Department of State, "Description of Consultation Arrangements Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan," 6 June 1960, Secret
Source: RG 59, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of East Asian Affairs Central Files, 1947-1964, box 24, U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (Conference Briefing Book), (also available in Digital National Security Archive and published microfiche collection, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 1960-1976, Washington, D.C., 1995)

The 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty remains secret to this day but its basic features, summarized in this briefing paper, had important implications for the U.S. nuclear posture in Northeast Asia. While deployments of nuclear weapons to U.S. bases in Japan would require consultation with Japanese authorities, ordinary military movements, such as the transfer of units and equipment, would not. The later would include "transit of ports or airbases in Japan by United States vessels and aircraft, regardless of their armament." In other words, U.S. ships or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons could use ports or bases on Japanese territory for "transit" to other destinations. For the most part this would mean brief ship visits or airport landings, but in one notorious incident, the U.S. Marines interpreted transit to permit long-term presence when they deployed, from the mid-1950s to 1966, the USS San Joaquin County, a tank landing ship loaded with nuclear bombs only a few hundred yards from Japanese soil. (Note 26)

Document 16: "Understanding with the Federal Republic Concerning the Introduction, Storage, and Use of Nuclear Weapons with Respect to West Germany," 6 May 1955, Top Secret, cover sheet attached
Source: RG 59, Records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1950-1962, box 2, II.2.A. NN. Germany 1954-1958 Defense (also available in National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Weapons and Politics in the Missile Era, 1955-68)

Not long after the U.S. military began deploying complete nuclear weapons in West Germany, the U.S. High Commissioner, James B. Conant, took up the matter with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, seeking assurance that, once West Germany regained its sovereignty, the United States would be able to continue storing nuclear weapons on German territory. Adenauer quickly approved the request, which enabled the U.S. government to take the position that "it will continue to enjoy the right to introduce, store and use atomic weapons in the territory of Western Germany as long as the United States has forces there." It was not until 1967 that German officials began actively seeking an understanding with Washington that it would consult with Bonn on the "selective use" of nuclear weapons stockpiled in West Germany. (Note 27)

Documents 17A-C: The Philippines and Stockpile Secrecy

Document 17A: Robert McClintock, Office of Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to the Secretary, "Talking Points for Discussion with Senators Fulbright and Symington re Subcommittee Hearings on US Commitments Abroad," 25 September 1969, Top Secret

Document 17B: Robert McClintock to the Secretary and Acting Secretary, "Meeting of Kissinger Committee on Symington Subcommittee," 30 September 1969, Top Secret

Document 17C: Robert McClintock to Acting Secretary [Elliot Richardson], "Presidential Decision on Categories of Information for Symington Subcommittee to be protected by executive privilege," [c. 30 September 1969], Top Secret
Source: RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files 1967-1969, DEF 12

In early 1969, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-MO) became chairman of the newly-established Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, which was a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Active through 1974, the Symington Subcommittee probed the extent of U.S. secret agreements with, and commitments to, foreign governments and discovered the great degree to which Congress had relinquished its constitutional duties and to which the Nixon administration and its predecessors had evaded their constitutional obligations to consult with the legislative branch. Pulling away the shroud of secrecy required investigators and Symington hired Roland Paul, a former Pentagon lawyer, and Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus (who had worked for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier in the decade). After Paul and Pincus visited Spain, where they uncovered nuclear deployments, they traveled to Laos and the Philippines, where they learned much about the classified aspects of the U.S. presence in those countries: in Laos, CIA officers were conducting a "secret war" and in the Philippines nuclear weapons were secretly deployed among local officials, only President Ferdinand Marcos was aware of the arrangement.

As these documents suggest, the Nixon administration, worried that the deployment in the Philippines would leak and disrupt presidential elections there, determined to keep them secret by rejecting the Symington Subcommittee's requests for information. Thus, top Nixon administration officials, including national security adviser Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, agreed that in any hearings, government witnesses would refuse to testify on nuclear deployments by invoking executive privilege. The administration argued that the information was top secret and that the Subcommittee was not the proper venue for discussion of nuclear deployments. That hard-line stance ultimately collapsed when the White House acceded to Senator Fulbright's insistence that the Subcommittee receive a briefing on the deployments. On 27 May 1970, Ronald I. Spiers, director of the Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, delivered a top secret briefing although the Bureau, not the Subcommittee, retained control of the transcript. The Symington Subcommittee later observed that the administration's initial refusal to share information "is obviously absurd, is used to cover up questionable policy, is unconstitutional, and is against the best interests of the United States." (Note 28)

1.George Lardner Jr., "DOE Puts Declassification in Reverse," The Washington Post, May 19, 2001, http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/05/wp051901.html.

2. Raymond L. Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 2001), 203-204.
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2005-annual-report.pdf.

3. For the current situation, see Natural Resources Defense Council report prepared by Hans M. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf>.

4. Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 91st Congress, Volume II (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1971), 2431.

5. For the 1978 Pentagon release and an effort to interpret the excised portions, see Robert S. Norris, William Arkin, and William Burr, "Where They Were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55 (November-December 1999): 26-35, and "How Much Did Japan Know," ibid. 56 (Jan.-Feb. 2000), 11-13, 78-79.

6. For detailed studies of the U.S.-Canada nuclear relationship, largely based on declassified Canadian documents, see John M. Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold History of Canada's Cold War Arsenal (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1998), and U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Canada (Toronto: Dundurn Group, 1999).

7. For the Department of Energy's public reports on its Kyl-Lott review, see http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/. For the differences between Restricted Data [RD] and Formerly Restricted Data [FRD], see a Department of Energy pamphlet reproduced on the Web page of the Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/doe/sakwd.htm

8.For the Department of Energy's public reports on its Kyl-Lott review, see http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/. For a general discussion of the differences between Restricted Data [RD] and Formerly Restricted Data [FRD], see a Department of Energy pamphlet reproduced on the Web page of the Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/doe/sakwd.htm. For an argument for greater transparency of nuclear weapons information, but also for protecting weapons design secrets, see Annette Schaper, Looking for a Demarcation Between Nuclear Transparency and Nuclear Secrecy, PRIF Report No. 68, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Germany), 10-16, at http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/PRIF-68.pdf

9. The whole series of reports by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Classification may be found on the Federation of American Scientists Web site at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/index.html.

10. Information provided by Mr. Kenneth Stein, Office of Classification, Department of Energy in e-mail, 8 August 2006. Mr. James Wendt, Office of Document Reviews, provided an annual breakdown for the expenditures: FY 99: 1.992M FY 00: 3.582 M FY 01: 3.653M FY 02: 3.852M FY 03: 3.072M FY 04: 2.482M FY 05: 1.761M FY 06: 1.313M Total: 21.707M. E-mail, 10 August 2006.

11. Lardner, "DOE Puts Declassification in Reverse," The Washington Post, May 19, 2001.

12. For an argument in favor of declassifying most information on nuclear deployments, past and present, see Schaper, Looking for a Demarcation Between Nuclear Transparency and Nuclear Secrecy, 10-16, at
http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/PRIF-68.pdf

13. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 2431.

14. Communication from Morton Halperin, 27 March 2006.

15. Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001), 114.

16. Again, see the Clearwater studies cited in endnote 3.

18. Thanks to Leopoldo Nuti (University of Rome)--who has a major book in progress on the history of U.S. nuclear weapons in Italy--for the citation to the January 13, 1962, agreement.

19. See the Kristensen report cited in endnote 3.

20. For discussion of the air bases agreement and Norway's posture on nuclear weapons during the late 1950s, see Rolf Tammes, The United States and Norway in the High North (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1991), at pages 72-74 and 160-65, respectively.

21. For details on the history of the consultative arrangements, see "`Consultation is Presidential Business': Secret Understandings on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 159, at www.gwu.edu/

22. For documentation on the removal of the weapons from the Philippines, see declassified documents published by the Nautilus Institute, at http://www.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/foia/taiwphil.html.

23. John Clearwater, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Canada, 125-126.

24. This report was an important source for Norris et al., "Where They Were" [see note 5].

25. Leopoldo Nuti's forthcoming study provides a thorough account of the negotiations.

26. Hans Kristensen, Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella, at www.nauitlus.org.

27. See documents 25A-B in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 159, "'Consultation is Presidential Business': Secret Understandings on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974,"at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB159/index.htm.

28. For Fulbright, the Symington Subcommittee, Paul, and Pincus, see Randall Bennett Woods, Fulbright: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 305-307, 506-511, and 525-527, as well as James C. Olson, Stuart Symington: A Life (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 392-398. For Fulbright's success in getting an executive session on the deployments, see "Administration Trap Feared by Doves on Foreign Relations Committee," The Washington Post, 23 July 1970. For the quotation from the Symington Subcommittee, see United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 2427.


JUNE 14 – 20, 2021

JUNE 18-19-20, 2021 – AR, SPRINGDALE | Gun & Knife Show – 3-Day Show – Confirmed
NW Arkansas Convention Center, 1500 S. 48th Street – Springdale, AR 72762 | Show hours: Friday Noon – 7:00 pm, Saturday 9:00 am – 5:00 pm & Sunday 9:00 am – 4:00 pm | Call Allen for more information at 918-658-4500

JUNE 18-19-20, 2021 – CO, LOVELAND | Loveland Gun Show
Larimer County Fairgrounds – The Ranch Events Complex, 5280 Arena Circle – Loveland, CO 80538 | 500 Tables | Show hours: Friday 3:00 pm-7:00 pm, Saturday 9:00 am-5:00 pm, Sunday 9:00 am-4:00 pm – Admission: $15.00 for the weekend | Promoter Contact: Tanner Gun Shows 720-514-0114 | Web: tannergunshow.com

June 18-20 CO, Pagosa Springs. Archuleta County Fairgrounds, 344 US Hwy-84. Tables: $60 ea. Set up: Fri Noon-5p & Sat 7-9a. Show hours: Fri 5p-8p, Sat 9a-5p, Sun 9a-1p. Adm: $5, weekend pass $10, ages 12 & under free. Contact: Mike Budde 970-946-2841 [email protected]

June 18-20 IA, Sioux City. Tyson Event Center, 401 Gordon Dr, Sioux City, IA 51101. Tables: $50 ea. Show hours: Fri 4-9, Sat 9-5, Sun 9-3. Contact: Marv Kraus Promotions 563-608-4401 www.marvkrauspromotions.net

JUNE 18-19-20, 2021 – VA, CHANTILLY | The Nation’s Gun Show
Dulles Expo Center, 4320 Chantilly Shopping Center – Chantilly, VA 20153 | 1,300 Tables (8 ft): Aisle $125.00 – Wall $130.00 | Set up: Thursday 3 – 8 pm, Friday 9 am – 1 pm, Saturday & Sunday 8 – 9 am | Utilities: Electricity $95.00 – Phone $195.00 – Free WiFi | Show hours: Friday 1 – 8 pm, Saturday 9 am – 6 pm, & Sunday 9 am – 5 pm | Admission: Friday $14.00 – Saturday & Sunday $17.00 daily – 3 Day Pass $23.00 (Cash or Credit Card) – Children 12-17 $9.00 – Kids under 12 admitted FREE with supervising adult | FREE PARKING | Several seminars offered at the show (see our website for more information) | Contact: Showmasters Gun Shows | 540-951-1344 / 540-951-2344 / Fax: 540-951-1424 | E-mail: [email protected] | Web: https://www.showmastersgunshows.com/ | Visit the Nation’s Gun Show website https://www.thenationsgunshow.com/ | Vendors page link

JUNE 18-19-20, 2021 – MT, TWIN BRIDGES | Twin Bridges Gun Show
Madison County Fair Grounds, 2 Fairgrounds Loop – Twin Bridges, MT 59754 | 100 Tables: $35.00 each | Set up: Friday 10 am – 3 pm | Show hours: Friday 3 pm – 7 pm, Saturday 9 am – 5 pm, Sunday 9 am – 3 pm | Contact: Up In Arms | Lisa 208-420-2295 | E-mail: [email protected] | Web: http://upinarmsgunshows.com/

June 19-20 GA, Perry. Georgia National Fairgrounds, 401 Larry Walker Parkway. Show hours: Sat 9-5, Sun 10-4. Tables: $85/$75 prepaid, elec. $35. Contact: Eastman Gun Shows 563-927-8176 email [email protected] web www.rkshows.com

June 19-20 KY, Lexington. Lexington Horse Park, 4089 Iron Works Parkway. Tables: $71/$61 prepaid, Elect $75. Show hours: Sat 9-5, Sun 9-4. Contact: Kenny Woods Gun Shows 563-927-8176 email [email protected] web www.rkshows.com

June 19-20 MO, Kansas City. KCI Expo Center, 11730 N. Ambassador Dr. Tables: $81/$71 prepaid/non-gun $100, Elect $125. Show hours: Sat 8-5, Sun 9-3. Contact: RK Shows 563-927-8176 email [email protected] web www.rkshows.com

JUNE 19-20, 2021– NC, RALEIGH | Raleigh Gun Show
NC State Fairgrounds – Exposition Center, 1025 Blue Ridge Rd, Raleigh, NC 27607 | 450 (8 ft) Tables: $70.00 each | Elec. $25.00 | Set up: Friday 12-8 pm & Saturday 7-9 am | Show hours: Saturday 9 am – 5 pm & Sunday 10 am – 5 pm | Admission: $10.00 – Youths under 12 years of age admitted FREE with adult | Contact: C & E Gun Shows | 888-715-0606 / 540-953-0016 | E-mail: [email protected] | Web: https://www.cegunshows.com/

JUNE 19-20, 2021 – OH, COLUMBUS | Gun Show @ the Westland Mall
Westland Mall (former Sears Building), 4411 West Broad St., Columbus, OH 43228 | 400 (8 ft) Tables: $70.00 each | Free electricity | Set up: Friday 12-8 pm & Saturday 7-9 am | Show hours: Saturday 9 am – 5 pm & Sunday 9 am – 4 pm | Admission: $10.00 – Youths under 12 years of age admitted FREE with adult | Contact: C & E Gun Shows | 888-715-0606 / 540-953-0016 | E-mail: [email protected] | Web: https://www.cegunshows.com/

JUNE 19-20, 2021 – PA, ALLENTOWN | Eagle Arms Productions Allentown Gun Show
Parkview Inn, 1151 Bulldog Drive – Allentown, PA 18104 | Vendors: 250 Tables | Public: Show hours are Saturday 9:00 am-4:00 pm & Sunday 9:00 am-3:00 pm (EAGEL VIP: 30-minute early admission both days for Law Enforcement, Seniors, Veterans, & Wheelchair/Handicap) – Admission: $8.00 | Promoter Contact: Eagle Arms Productions 610-393-3047 – E-mail: [email protected] – Web: www.eagleshows.com

June 19-20 PA, Quarryville. Solanco Fairgrounds, 172 S. Lime St. 17566. 100+ 8’ Tables: $35 ea. Set up: Fri 3-9p, Sat 6-8a. Show hours: Sat 8-4, Sun 8-2. Adm: $5, children under 12 free w/ adult. Contact: Jim 717-368-4653, [email protected]

June 19-20 TN, Knoxville. Expo Center, 5441 Clinton Hwy. Tables: $76/$66 prepaid, Elect $75. Show hours: Sat 9-5, Sun 10-4. Contact: RK Shows 563-927-8176 email [email protected] web www.rkshows.com

June 19-20 – TX, Dayton. Dayton Community Center, 801 S. Cleveland St. 200 Tables: $60. Set up: Fri 8a-7p, Sat 7-9a. Show hours: Sat 9-5, Sun 9-3. Adm: $8 cash only. Contact: Amanda Wilson 936-258-6630 [email protected] https://www.cityofdaytontx.com/

June 19-20TX, Mesquite (Confirmed). Big Town Event Center, 2323 Big Town Blvd. 750 (8 ft) Tables: $85 ea. Set up: Fri 10a-7p & Sat 7:30-9a. Show hours: Sat 9-5, Sun 10-4. Adm: $10, weekend pass $15, children 11 & under and Uniformed Peace Officers free. Contact: Premier Gun Shows 817-732-1194 [email protected]

June 19-20 TX, Pasadena. Pasadena Convention Center: 7902 Fairmont Pkwy. 300 Tables: $85 per table. Set up: Fri 12-7p, Sat 7:30-9a. Show hours: Sat 9a-5p, Sun 10a-4p. Adm: $10, children 12 & under free. Contact: Mary Bean 281-412-4824 email: [email protected]

June 19-20 WA, Ridgefield. Fairgrounds-Clark County Events Center, 17402 NE Delfel Rd. Show hours: Sat 9a-6p, Sun 9a-4p. Adm: General $10, Military $5 (with ID), Kids under 18 free with an adult. Contact promoter: Big Top Promotions 425-749-3872 email [email protected] web bigtoppromos.com

JUNE 21 – 27, 2021

June 25-27 IA, Council Bluffs. Westfair, 22984 US-6, Council Bluffs, IA 51503. Tables: $40 ea. Show hours: Fri 4-9, Sat 9-5, Sun 9-3. Contact: Marv Kraus Promotions 563-608-4401 www.marvkrauspromotions.net

June 25-27 MO, Ste. Genevieve. Ste. Gene Community Center, 21390 MO-32. Tables: $50 ea./2-3 $45 ea./4-5 $40 ea./6+ $35 ea. Set up: Fri 9a-4p. Show hours: Fri 4-8p, Sat 9a-5p, Sun 9a-3p. Adm: $10. Contact: Militia Armaments Gun Club 610-486-7469 email: [email protected]

June 26 OH, Sidney. Shelby Co. Fairgrounds, 655 S. Highland Ave (from I-75 take exit 90 east I mi. Fair Road). 100 Tables $15 ea. Show hours: Sat 8:30-2. Adm: $5, children 14 & under free. Contact: 937-418-2179, email [email protected]

JUNE 26-27, 2021 – AR, BENTON | Murphy’s Saline County Gun & Knife Show
Benton Event Center, 17322 I-30 – Benton, AR 72019 | Vendors: 280 (8 ft) Tables (1-4 $55.00) (5+ $50.00) – Set up Friday 1:00-8:00 pm & Saturday 6:30-8:30 am | Public: Show hours are Saturday 9:00 am-5:00 pm & Sunday 9:00 am-4:00 pm – Admission $10.00 – Ages 11-15 $5.00 – Ages 10 & under Free – Active duty or retired Military with ID and Police $2.00 discount – Admission price is good for both days | We give one firearm as a Door Prize at Every Show! | Promoter Contact: Kerry Murphy Promotions 501-580-3737 – E-mail: [email protected] FB: @KerryMurphyPromotions – Mail payments to Kerry Murphy Promotions, 29 Bald Eagle Drive – Paron, AR 72122

June 26-27 GA, Perry. Georgia National Fairgrounds,401 Larry Walker Parkway. Tables $95/$85 prepaid/non-gun $110, Elect. $35. Show hours: Sat 9-5, Sun 10-4. Contact: Eastman Gun Shows 563-927-8176 email [email protected] web www.rkshows.com

JUNE 26-27, 2021 – KS, HAYES | Gun & Knife Show – Confirmed
Ellis County Fairgrounds, 1344 Fairgrounds Road (Exit 157 off of I-70) – Hayes, KS 67601 | Show hours: Saturday 9:00 am – 5:00 pm & Sunday 9:00 am – 4:00 pm | Call Allen for more information at 918-658-4500


Total Nuclear Weapons: 13,082

About the World Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Report

Thirty one years after the end of the Cold War, the world’s combined stockpiles of nuclear weapons remain at unacceptably high levels.

Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda of the Federation of American Scientists are the leading experts in estimating the size of global nuclear weapons inventories. The table is a compilation of their estimates and analyses, with links to their full reports. These reports are published in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' Nuclear Notebook and discussed further at the FAS Strategic Security Blog.

As the authors of these estimates note, the above numbers may not add up due to rounding and uncertainty about the operational statuses and size of the total inventories. For a full analysis of how the authors arrived at their estimates, please view the provided links for the complete reports.

Current information from these same authors on US ballistic missile defense is now also available.


How do U.S. gun laws compare to other countries?

The debate over gun control in the United States has waxed and waned over the years, stirred by a series of mass shootings by gunmen in civilian settings. In particular, the killing of twenty schoolchildren in Newtown, Connecticut, in 2012 prompted a new national discussion about gun laws. However, legislation that would have banned semiautomatic assault weapons was defeated in the Senate despite extensive public support. In 2017, mass shootings at a music festival in Las Vegas and at a church near San Antonio have rekindled the gun control debate and invoked comparisons of U.S. gun policies and those of other wealthy democracies.

United States

Gun ownership in the United States is rooted in the Second Amendment of the Constitution: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

However, the right is not unlimited. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld some firearms restrictions, such as bans on concealed weapons and on the possession of certain types of weapons, as well as prohibitions against the sale of guns to certain categories of people. The Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibits persons under eighteenyears of age, convicted criminals, the mentally disabled, dishonorably discharged military personnel, and others from purchasing firearms. In 1993, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act mandated background checks for all unlicensed persons purchasing a firearm from a federally authorized dealer.

At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court has rolled back certain gun laws. In 2008, the court struck down a Washington, DC, law that banned handguns.

Federal law provides the basis for firearm regulation in the United States, but states and cities can impose further restrictions. Some states, such as Idaho, Alaska, and Kansas, have passed various laws attempting to nullify federal gun legislation, but legal analysts say these are unconstitutional.

In January 2016, President Barack Obama took several actions intended to decrease gun violence, including a measure requiring dealers of firearms at gun shows or online to obtain federal licenses and conduct background checks.

As of 2017, there were no federal laws banning semiautomatic assault weapons, military-style .50 caliber rifles, handguns, or large-capacity magazines. There was a federal prohibition on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines between 1994 and 2004, but Congress allowed these restrictions to expire. In the days after the mass shooting in Las Vegas, in October, some lawmakers expressed provisional support for a federal prohibition of so-called bump fire stocks, devices that allow semiautomatic guns to fire at a rate approaching that of automatic weapons.

As in the United States, Canada’s national government sets gun restrictions that the provinces, territories, and municipalities can supplement. And like its southern neighbor, Canada’s gun laws have often been driven by gun violence. In 1989, a student armed with a semiautomatic rifle killed fourteen students and injured more than a dozen others at a Montreal engineering school. The incident is widely credited with driving major gun reforms that imposed a twenty-eight-day waiting period for purchases mandatory safety training courses more detailed background checks bans on large-capacity magazines and bans or greater restrictions on military-style firearms and ammunition.

Firearms in Canada are divided into three classes: nonrestricted weapons, such as ordinary rifles and shotguns restricted, such as handguns and semiautomatic rifles/shotguns and prohibited, such as automatic weapons. It is illegal to own a fully automatic weapon unless it was registered before 1978.

Changes to the law in 1995 required individuals to obtain a license to buy guns and ammunition, as well as register all firearms. However, in 2012, the requirement to register nonrestricted guns was dropped, and related public records were expunged.

The inflection point for modern gun control in Australia was the Port Arthur massacre of 1996, when a young man killed thirty-five people and wounded nearly two dozen others. The rampage, perpetrated with a semiautomatic rifle, was the worst mass shooting in the nation’s history. Less than two weeks later, the conservative-led national government pushed through fundamental changes to the country’s gun laws in cooperation with the various states and territories, which regulate firearms.

The National Agreement on Firearms all but prohibited automatic and semiautomatic assault rifles, mandated licensing and registration, and instituted a temporary gun buyback program that took some 650,000 assault weapons (about one-sixth of the national stock) out of public circulation. Among other things, the law also required licensees to demonstrate a “genuine need” for a particular type of gun and take a firearm safety course. After another high-profile shooting in Melbourne in 2002, Australia’s handgun laws were tightened as well. Many analysts say these measures have been highly effective, citing declining gun death rates and the absence of gun-related mass killings in Australia since 1996.

Military service is compulsory in Israel, and guns are a part of everyday life. Much of the population has indirect access to an assault weapon by either being a soldier or a reservist or a relative of one. By law, most eighteenyear-olds are drafted, psychologically screened, and provided at least some weapons training after high school. After serving typically two or three years in the armed forces, however, most Israelis are discharged and subject to civilian gun laws.

The country has relatively strict gun regulations, including an assault-weapons ban and a requirement to register ownership with the government. To become licensed, an applicant must be an Israeli citizen or a permanent resident, be at least twenty-one-years-old, and speak at least some Hebrew, among other qualifications. Applicants must also show genuine cause to carry a firearm, such as self-defense or hunting.

United Kingdom

Modern gun control efforts in the United Kingdom have been precipitated by extraordinary acts of violence that sparked public outrage and, eventually, political action. In 1987, a lone gunman armed with two semiautomatic rifles and a handgun went on a six-hour shooting spree roughly seventy miles west of London, killing more than a dozen people and then himself. In the wake of the incident, known as the Hungerford massacre, Britain introduced the Firearms (Amendment) Act, which expanded the list of banned weapons, including certain semiautomatic rifles, and increased registration requirements for other weapons.

A gun-related tragedy in the Scottish town of Dunblane in 1996 prompted Britain’s strictest gun laws yet. A man armed with four handguns shot and killed sixteen schoolchildren and one adult before committing suicide in the country’s worst mass shooting to date. The incident sparked a public campaign known as the Snowdrop Petition, which helped drive legislation banning handguns, with few exceptions. The government also instituted a temporary gun buyback program, which many credit with taking tens of thousands of illegal or unwanted guns out of supply.

Gun control had rarely been much of a political issue in Norway—where gun laws are viewed as tough, but ownership rates are high—until right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik killed seventy-seven people in attacks in Oslo and at an island summer camp in 2011. Though Norway ranked tenth worldwide in gun ownership, according to the Small Arms Survey, it placed near the bottom in gun homicide rates. (The U.S. rate is roughly sixty-four times higher.) Most Norwegian police, like the British, do not carry firearms.

Gun control advocates regularly cite Japan’s highly restrictive firearm regulations in tandem with its extraordinarily low gun homicide rate, which is the lowest in the world at one in ten million, according to the latest data available. Most guns are illegal in the country and ownership rates, which are quite small, reflect this.

Under Japan’s firearm and sword law [PDF], the only guns permitted are shotguns, air guns, guns with specific research or industrial purposes, or those used for competitions. However, before access to these specialty weapons is granted, one must obtain formal instruction and pass a battery of written, mental, and drug tests and a rigorous background check. Furthermore, owners must inform the authorities of how their weapons and ammunition are stored and provide their firearms for annual inspection.

Some analysts link Japan’s aversion to firearms with its demilitarization in the aftermath of World War II. Others say that because the overall crime rate in the country is so low, most Japanese see no need for firearms.

This backgrounder first appeared on the Council on Foreign Relations’ website. View the original report here.

Left: A Chicago police officer examines a gun that was handed over as part of a "Gun Turn-in" event in Chicago on May 28. Photo by Jim Young/Reuters


The deadliest weapons on Earth, ranked

A common thread through human history is the constant development of deadly new combat technologies. The US Army and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists have completed research on weapons used throughout history, using real-world data from battles to calculate their "lethality index," a numerical way to show how deadly each weapon can be that accounts for weapon range, rate of fire, accuracy, radius of effect and battlefield mobility.

Here&aposs how the US Army&aposs rankings fell.


Lie by Lie: A Timeline of How We Got Into Iraq

Jonathan Stein

Tim Dickinson

At a congressional hearing examining the march to war in Iraq, Republican congressman Walter Jones posed “a very simple question” about the administration’s manipulation of intelligence: “How could the professionals see what was happening and nobody speak out?”

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, responded with an equally simple answer: “The vice president.”

But the blame for Iraq does not end with Cheney, Bush, or Rumsfeld. Nor is it limited to the intelligence operatives who sat silent as the administration cherry-picked its case for war, or with those, like Colin Powell or Hans Blix, who, in the name of loyalty or statesmanship, did not give full throat to their misgivings. It is also shared by far too many in the Fourth Estate, most notably the New York Times‘ Judith Miller. But let us not forget that it lies, inescapably, with we the American people, who, in our fear and rage over the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001, allowed ourselves to be suckered into the most audacious bait and switch of all time.

The first drafts of history are, by their nature, fragmentary. They arrive tragically late, and too often out of order. Back in 2006, we attempted to strip the history of the runup to the war to its bones, to reconstruct a skeleton that we thought might be key in resolving the open questions of the Bush era. As we prepare to leave Iraq, we present that timeline to you again. MotherJones.com offers a greatly expanded (if now technologically outdated) version of this timeline, one that is completely sourced to primary documents and initial news accounts. It was our hope to make this second draft of history as definitive as possible. So that we won’t be fooled again.&mdashTHE EDITORS

On vacation in Crawford, Bush receives a Presidential Daily Briefing warning, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” FBI highlights Al Qaeda activities consistent with hijacking preparations, as well as surveillance of federal buildings. [Date the public knew: 5/18/02]

CIA officer flies to Crawford to call Bush’s attention to document. Bush replies, “All right, you’ve covered your ass now.” [Date the public knew: 6/20/06]


U.S. Relations With Syria

The United States established diplomatic relations with Syria in 1944 following the U.S. determination that Syria had achieved effective independence from a French-administered mandate. Syria severed diplomatic relations with the United States in 1967 in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War. Relations were reestablished in 1974. Syria has been on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism since the list’s inception in 1979 because of its continued support of terrorism and terrorist groups, its former occupation of Lebanon, its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and use of chemical weapons, and its ongoing efforts to undermine U.S. and international stabilization activities in Iraq and Syria. Syria is subject to legislatively mandated penalties, including export sanctions under the Syrian Accountability Act and ineligibility to receive most forms of U.S. assistance or to purchase U.S. military equipment. Since conflict erupted in Syria in March 2011, subsequent Executive Orders have been issued in response to the ongoing violence and human rights abuses taking place in Syria.

From 1990-2001, the United States and Syria cooperated to a degree on some regional issues, but relations worsened from 2003 to early 2009. Issues of U.S. concern included the Syrian government’s failure to prevent Syria from becoming a major transit point for foreign fighters entering Iraq, its refusal to deport from Syria former Saddam Hussein regime elements supporting the insurgency in Iraq, its interference in Lebanese affairs, its protection of the leadership of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Damascus, its human rights record, and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In early 2009, the United States began to review its Syria policy in light of changes in the country and the region, leading to an effort to engage with Syria to find areas of mutual interest, reduce regional tensions, and promote Middle East peace.

In late February 2011, the Syrian government arrested a group of Syrian school children in the southern city of Dara’a for writing political graffiti on walls that said, “It’s your turn, Doctor,” suggesting that Assad would meet the fate of other leaders in the region. The government’s brutal response to the Syrian people’s call for freedom and dignity sparked nation-wide demonstrations and escalating tensions, which descended into an armed conflict that has lasted more than nine years, taken more than 500,000 lives, and displaced over 12 million people within the country and beyond its borders.

The United States supports the UN-facilitated, Syrian-led process mandated by UNSCR 2254. There is no military solution to the Syrian conflict. As we have seen, the Syrian regime, Russian, and Iranian military actions only offer more destruction and death.

Since the rise of ISIS in 2014, the U.S. government has worked closely with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS to achieve a lasting defeat of the terror group. Working by, with, and through local partners, the Coalition achieved the territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria in March 2019. The Coalition remains committed to ISIS’s enduring defeat through stabilization support to liberated areas, facilitating the return of displaced individuals, finding long-term solutions for detained foreign ISIS fighters, and promoting justice and accountability efforts in Syria and Iraq.

U.S. Assistance to Syria

The United States is the largest single donor to the humanitarian response in Syria, providing over $12.2 billion in humanitarian assistance for vulnerable individuals inside Syria and those displaced in the region since the start of the crisis. The U.S. government supports emergency food assistance, shelter, safe drinking water, urgent medical care, humanitarian protection activities, and other urgent relief. U.S. humanitarian aid reaches 4.8 million people inside Syria’s 14 governorates every month, as well as more than five million of the 5.6 5 million refugees from Syria in the region.

In northwest Syria, from 2012 to 2018, the United States provided non-humanitarian assistance to bolster the Syrian opposition. This assistance included: supporting local councils, activists, and civil society organizations to counter the influence of extremist groups like Al-Qaeda, including their ability to recruit youth and disenfranchised Syrians, and provide essential services to their communities supporting journalists and independent media outlets to counter regime and extremist narratives and to provide unbiased reporting to their communities bolstering the education sector to keep children in opposition-held areas in school and deliver quality education providing non-lethal assistance to units of the Free Syrian Army and Free Syrian Police who protected communities resisting both AQ, extremist, and regime influence and control and supporting those members and organizations in the community engaging in political negotiations, among other activities.

In southwest Syria, the United States provided non-humanitarian assistance to support the moderate Syrian opposition and to bolster the de-escalation arrangement until the regime took over control of this region in July 2018. This assistance included: capacity-building for local governance entities essential service restoration and, non-lethal support to units of the Free Syrian Army and Free Syrian Police to promote safety and stability.

In northeast Syria, the United States is working with our partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS to support the enduring defeat of ISIS through stabilization efforts in liberated areas. To date, U.S. stabilization and early recovery efforts have focused on restoring essential services like water and electricity supporting local governance and civil society to meet citizens’ needs improving and supporting the education sector to help children return to school and to provide vocational training supporting independent media to provide locally-relevant and accurate information to citizens removing explosive remnants of war generating economic activity providing support and training for community security providers supporting transitional justice and accountability, reconciliation, and reintegration efforts at the community level and, building local capacity to support longer-term sustainability.

To date, the United States has been the largest provider of stabilization assistance in NE Syria, providing over $350 million in funding since late-2016 for stabilization and early recovery programs. For all areas of Syria, the United States has provided more than $1.3 billion in stabilization assistance since 2011. This includes the announcement in October 2019 of $50 million in new funding to continue these stabilization efforts with a focus on supporting religious and ethnic minorities. Additionally, through intensive efforts to encourage burden-sharing within the D-ISIS Coalition, the United States has secured pledges and commitments of over $700 million since 2018 from Coalition partners for stabilization and early recovery efforts in NE Syria. Of the contributions raised, over $180 million was contributed directly to U.S. government accounts to fund ongoing U.S. government programs.

Bilateral Economic Relations

The United States maintains comprehensive sanctions on Syria that broadly restrict the ability of U.S. persons to engage in transactional dealings involving the Government of Syria. The Government of Syria and its affiliated entities have been subject to U.S. economic sanctions since 2004 under the Syria Accountability Act, which prohibits or restricts the export and re-export of most U.S. products to Syria. Sanctions in August 2008 prohibited the export of U.S. services to Syria and banned U.S. persons from involvement in the Syrian petroleum sector, including a prohibition on importing Syrian petroleum products. In response to regime brutality against peaceful protesters beginning in 2011, the U.S. Government imposed additional sanctions beginning in April 2011, designating those complicit in human rights abuses or supporting the Assad regime. In April and May 2012, the U.S. Government authorized additional sanctions for serious human rights abuse against the Syrian people and for efforts and activities undertaken to evade sanctions. In 2019, the U.S. government authorized a new sanctions program under Executive Order 13894 that allows for sanctions to be levied on those preventing, disrupting, or obstructing a political solution to the Syrian conflict which includes both Syrians and any foreign enablers. In June 2020, the sanctions provisions of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act came into full effect, allowing the U.S. government to sanction regime financiers, officials, senior government figures around Bashar al Assad and their enablers, and military leaders who perpetuate the conflict and obstruct a peaceful, political resolution of the conflict as called for by UNSCR 2254. The U.S. Government is continuously identifying and designating individuals and entities subject to U.S. sanctions related to Syria, including but not limited to the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons and other atrocities against its own people.

Syria’s Membership in International Organizations

Syria and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. Syria also is an observer to the World Trade Organization.

Bilateral Representation

The U.S. Embassy in Damascus suspended its operations in February 2012. The Government of the Czech Republic, acting through its Embassy in Damascus, serves as protecting power for U.S. interests in Syria.

Syria maintained an embassy in the United States at 2215 Wyoming Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20008 until March 18, 2014, when the State Department notified the Syrian Embassy that their operations must be suspended immediately and that all personnel at the Embassy who are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents must depart by March 31, 2014. After this date of ordered departure, the United States no longer accredited Embassy personnel or regarded them as entitled to any of the diplomatic privileges, immunities, or protections. This notification also required the suspension of operations of Syria’s honorary consulates in Troy, Michigan and Houston, Texas.

More information about Syria is available from the Department of State and other sources, some of which are listed here:


NATO Review: where the experts come to talk

NATO Review online magazine looks at key security issues through the eyes of the experts

How important does Madeleine Albright believe energy security is? Where does Paddy Ashdown believe the Balkans is heading? And how do award-winning journalists, economists and researchers see the future in diverse issues from organised crime to climate change?

Cyber attacks - when the most serious ones happened, to whom - and the consequences.

‘A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremists groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11.’

Leon E. Panetta
(Former US Secretary of Defense)

And NATO is not immune. In 2012 alone, NATO's systems suffered over 2,500 significant cyber attacks. None broke through its defences. But it is just one part of the backdrop to NATO having its first ministerial level discussion of how to provide cybersecurity.

At that meeting, it was agreed that a NATO cyberdefence capability should be fully operational by autumn 2013.

'We are all closely connected. So an attack on one Ally, if not dealt with quickly and effectively, can affect us all. Cyber-defence is only as effective as the weakest link in the chain. By working together, we strengthen the chain,' said NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.


MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX TODAY

Since Eisenhower delivered it in 1961, his farewell speech has come to be a touchstone for those with concerns about unchecked military expansion, and the continuing close ties between private military contractors, members of the military establishment and the federal government.

The United States regularly spends far more on its military than any other country, though its defense spending is usually a relatively small percentage of the nation’s total gross domestic product (GDP), compared with some other countries.

According to a 2014 report by the Council of Foreign Relations, in the years after World War II, national defense spending as a percentage of GDP ranged from a high of 15 percent in 1952 (during the Korean War) to a low of 3.7 percent in 2000. Military spending rose sharply again the following year, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to the U.S. government declaring a global war on terrorism.

Military expenditures, which are included in the discretionary spending category in the federal budget, include a base budget for the U.S. Department of Defense as well as additional spending on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

In fiscal year 2016, according to the Pew Research Center, the U.S. government spent some $604 billion on national defense, which made up 15 percent of its total spending of about $3.95 trillion.

By contrast, a two-year budget deal passed by Congress and signed by President Donald Trump in February 2018 approved some $716 billion for defense spending in fiscal year 2019, compared with $605 in non-defense domestic spending.